Testimony of Cardinal Adam Maida
01 September 1993
Michigan Commission on Death and Dying
Chairman Brody and members of the Michigan Commission on Death and Dying, I am Archbishop Adam J. Maida, Chairman of the Michigan Catholic Conference Board of Directors and Archbishop of Detroit:
As Archbishop of Detroit, responsible for the spiritual and moral guidance of 1.5 million Catholics, joining with my brother Bishops of the six other Dioceses of Michigan, I speak on behalf of the two million Catholics of this state.
I am here today not only to speak for the Catholic Church of the state but also to articulate principles which are shared by other religious bodies as well as thousands of people of good will who seek to affirm the dignity of every human person.
I am also here as a citizen of this state, concerned about P.A. 3, Section 7 of 1993. Although I could claim my right to speak on this issue solely as a religious leader, I am also a lawyer. I have chosen to focus my remarks on the pre-existing body of law and its principles; contained therein are sufficient grounds to argue for the defense of life. I speak in this vein of thought so as to make clear that our Catholic pro-life position is good religious teaching and sound public policy.
Before proceeding to argue the case on its legal merits, I wish to make a fundamental distinction which is necessary to remember: There is all the difference in the world between allowing a person to die and intervening with the intention to cause death.
With the concurrence of the Michigan Catholic Conference Board of Directors, I am here to offer testimony and support of Section 7 of 1993 P.A. 3 because it addresses the reality of death and the dignity of the human person. It does so without legalizing assisted suicide:
- It recognizes the right to reject unwanted medical treatment, including life-sustaining procedures, so that a suffering individual may die a natural death.
- So long as there is no actual intent to cause death, it also allows the prescribing of medications and procedures to relieve pain and discomfort, even if the result hastens or increases the risk of death.
- The only conduct criminalized is intentionally providing the physical means or intentionally participating in a physical act by which another person attempts or commits suicide.
What Section 7 criminalizes and what should be criminalized — is an act which is intended to cause the death of another living person.
To legalize conduct causing the death of another — even with the other’s consent — runs directly contrary to the history of case law in our nation. When the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted in 1868, 21 of 37 states and 18 of 30 ratifying states prohibited assisted suicide. Today, at least 35 states prohibit assisted suicide, either by specific legislation, or by making it a form of murder or manslaughter.
In adopting such legislation or revising existing statutes, many of those states conformed to the American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code, which is widely regarded as the greatest criminal law reform project of this century. Under Section 210.5(2) of the Code (Proposed Official Draft, 1962), conduct which “purposely aids or assists another to commit suicide” is a second degree felony if a suicide or attempted suicide results, and a misdemeanor otherwise.
If the state of Michigan legalizes assisted suicide, is not the state shirking one of its prime functions — namely the defense of all its members, especially the most vulnerable?
Courts in this state have rejected a wrongful life cause of action because the state should not be involved in making value judgments about the quality of a life. As stated in Proffitt v Bartolo, 162 Mich App 35 (1987):
“This Court cannot weigh the value of life with impairments against the nonexistence of life itself.” 162 Mich. App. at 47, quoting Gleitman v Cosgrove, 49 NJ 22, 28; 227 A2d 689 (1967).
As Chief Justice Rehnquist stated in Cruzan v Director, Missouri Department of Health, 497 US 261, 110 SCt 2841, 2853 (1990):
“...[W]e think a state may properly decline to make judgments about the ‘quality’ of life that a particular individual may enjoy, and simply assert an unqualified interest in the preservation of human life to be weighed against the constitutionally protected interests of the individual.”
In Michigan, that interest is best stated in People v Roberts, 211 Mich. 187 (1920). In Roberts, the court found that the defendant was properly convicted of the statutory crime of murder by poison when, at his wife’s request, he prepared a poison which she used to commit suicide. The wife had multiple sclerosis and had previously attempted suicide without his assistance. The court held that such an assisted suicide was purposeful murder regardless of the victim’s consent:
“True, the atrocity of the crime, in a moral sense, would be greatly diminished by the fact that suicide was intended; yet the law, as we understand it, makes no discrimination on that account. The lives of all are equally under the protection of the law, and under that protection to their last moment. The life of those to whom life has become a burden — of those who are hopelessly diseased or fatally wounded — nay, even the lives of criminals condemned to death, are under the protection of the law, equally as the lives of those who are in the full tide of life’s enjoyment, and anxious to continue to live.” Id. at 197, quoting Blackburn v State, 23 Ohio St. 146.
The words of Roberts are no less true today.
Section 7 demonstrates that it is possible to prohibit assisted suicide while at the same time protecting the right to refuse unnecessary treatment. By making assisted suicide a felony, it also demonstrated that the degree of punishment, as opposed to the value of the life taken, is properly the subject of legislative line drawing.
The sanctity of the rule of civilized society that one may not cause the death of another must be preserved. We ask this Commission to recognize that abiding principle.
Thank you.
